The Power of Incentives: Can We Get Better ESA Performance From Private Lands

Authors: R. N. Wilkins

The basic intent of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is clear – for species at-risk of extinction, the Act is to be a defense against species loss and a means for recovery. Upon examining the Act’s overall performance, it is increasingly clear that the record of recovery is poor. If the performance metric for the ESA is recovery and delisting, then the Act has not performed well at all. Econometric analyses have demonstrated what some have observed from experience – the action of listing a species under the ESA is ineffective in promoting recovery, it is often negative, and only becomes positive when accompanied by substantial funding (Ferraro et al. 2007). Other analyses conclude that recovery and delisting are not to be expected given the slight commitment of governmental resources for implementation (Schwartz 2008). Simply put, the ESA is not doing its stated job of recovering at-risk species and may be doomed to insufficient performance unless reformed (Bean 2006). With implementation for most species being directly focused on guarding against harm, mere survival may be the only expected outcome unless some effective solutions emerge.

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